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REPLY OF STATE ENGINEER TO BRIEF OF
AMICUS CURIAE
EDWARD W. CLYDE,
Specml

Ass'~t.

Atborney General

Until the brief of the Amicus Curiae was filed the
State Engineer took no part in the court proceedings
had herein. He neither participated in the submission of
the facts nor in writing of the brief on appeal. This
failure of the State Engineer to participate actively in the
court proceedings was prompted by the fact that it appeared by the pleadings simply to be a private dispute
betw·een two water users over the right to use waters
then running to waste.
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The Provo River Water Users Association has presented issues of much public importance in the future
development of water law in this state. ·The State Engineer thinks that it would be unfortunate if the issues
raised by the Amicus Curiae were to he decided upon
their merits here. Many of the parties who ultin1ately will
he affected by such a decision are not before the
court and their views in the n1atter have never
been pres-ented. Many of the facts essential to the detern1ination of the questions here presented are not before the court. The Amicus Curiae simply seeks to have
this court lay down a rule of law which underrules of
stare decisis will control this issue when it is finally prrsented by the real parties in interest upon all the material facts. It is not necessary for the Supreme Court
to make such a determination in the instant case and we
assert that the court should not do so.
ROLE OF THE COURTS IN REVIEWING THE DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER
We,- at the outset, ask the court to cast itself in the
role of the State Engineer confronted with the problem
of determining the issues of this case. We ask the court
to do this because it has already said, on more than one
occasion, that on review from the decision of the State
Engineer the issues before the court are no broader than
were the issues presented to the State Engineer. See for
example Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362,
wherein the Supreme Court expressly stated that on review of the decision of the State Engineer the district
court, which hears the matter de novo, can do no more
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than the State Engineer; and that on appeal to the Supreine Court the issues are limited to those which confronted the State Engineer in the approval or rejection
of an application.
ln reYie\\Ting the State :BJngineer 's decision therefore,
this court should nsstn-ne the role of the State Engineer.
rr'he Suprerne Court has time and again told the State Engineer that he has no judicial power and that he must not
attempt to decide judicial questions or determine vested
rights except in a very general way. See Little Cotton'vood Y. I.Cimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116; Eardley v.
Terry, supra; Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445,
154 P. 2d 748.
The action of the State Engineer in approving an
application is therefore not a judicial procedure. The
State Engineer must not attempt to adjudicate vested
rights. His problem is simply one of determining whether
or not, under the rules laid down by the Supreme Court
and the provisions of Section 100-3-8; U.C.A. 19'43, the
application should be approved. In approving the application the State Engineer need not- find affirmatively
that there is unappropriated water in the named source.
It is sufficient that he determine that there is a reasonable probability that the application can be perfected.
New applications should he favored, not hindered;
reasonable doubt as to whether the application should be
approved or rejected should he resolved in favor of approval. It is only w~ere there is no ;probability that the
application might be perfected that the State Engineer
should deny the application. Such was the holding of the
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court in Rocky Ford Irr·iga~t'ion Co. v. Klents Lake R·es.
Co., 104 Utah 202, 13'5 P. 2d 108. This has been the consistant holding of this court. See Little Cottowwood v.
Ki.mb~all, supra; Ea.rdley v. Terry, supra. In the Rocky
Ford case the Supreme Court said that an application to
appropriate rnust be approved, unless it "clearly" appears that there is no water available. Cases of doubt
must always be resolved in favor of approval. ·Thus the
court, acting in the role of the State Engineer, should
not reject an application unless it clearly appears that
there is no unappropriated water available.
The reason why the court has uniformally held that
doubts should be resolved in favor of the application is
that the approval of an application could not possibly
affect vested rights. Statements to this effect have run
through the court opinions for the past forty-five years.
In Yates v. N,ewton, 59 Utah 105, 202 P. 208, the court
said that no order of the State Engineer can disturh
vested rights in water. In Eardley v. Terry, supra, the
court said that no final rights are acquired until proof
of appropriation, required by Section 100-'3-16, is made
and a certificate of appTopriation has been issued. In
S·owards v. Me1agher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 1112, the court
held that the application to appropriate was nothing
more than a preliminary notice of intent. The State Engineer should examine the application to ascertain the
declared intent and, if there is any reasonable probability
to believe that a right might be perfected, the State Engineer has been told by this court that he should approve
the application.
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SHOULD THE APPLIC·ATION HA'TE BEEN
A;PPRO\rED ~
It is argued by the Amicus Curiae that there is no
unappropriated \Yater; that this record shows, "vithout
any shado\Y of a doubt, that the \Vaters in question are
O\Yned by the Provo R.iyer Water Users Association. The
proble1n presented is not simple nor· is the answer so
clear. In the fir~t place all Provo River Water Users Association has ~n application to appropriate water. An
application to appropriate is not an appropriation. It is
but a preliminary notice of intention. There is no appropriation of the water until certificate of appropriation is~ues. Therefore, so long as there are only applications on
a stream all of the waters thereof are unappropriated and
new applications ought not to he rejected. It is not anticipated that this principle of law will he seriously controverted. The Utah court has, time and again, said that
an application to appropriate is not a completed appropriation. See Sow,ards. v. MBagher, supra; RobmS'on v.
Schoenfeld, 62 Utah 233, 218 P. 1041; Deseret Livestock
Company v. H oopiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 47·9; Litt~e
Cottonw:o1od Water Co. v. Kimball, supra; Duche.sne
Couwt:y v. Humphreys, 106 Utah 332, 148 P. 2d 3·38.
1

·Thus if we assume a given stream yielding 10 c.f.s.
upon which applications to appropriate totalling 40 c.f.s.
have been filed, we still cannot conclude that all of the
water in the stream has been appropriated. In fact none
of it has. It is not until the water is put to beneficial use
and a certificate of appropriation has issued that the
court or the State Engineer can conclude that an approSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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priation has been made. So long as an application is
pending there are numerous places wher·e, because of,
delays, the priority date of the application may lapse,
thus validating a junior filing. Likewise an applicant
1nay file for G c.f.s. but when it comes to making proof
of appropriation he may only show that 1 c.f.s. has been
used. These reasons, among others, have prompted the
court consistently to hold that the application, even
though in good standing, is not an appropriation. Therefore public waters which are covered only by approved
filings cannot be considered to be appropriated. New
filings should be accepted until such time as proof is
submitted. It is therefore respectfully submitted that this
record clearly shows, even if the facts brought into the
record by the brief of the Amicus Curiae are assumed to
he true, that the waters in question are still unappropriated in that nothing has been done to appropriate
them except the filing of an application. Since that application may lapse, or since proof may not be submitted,
the law does not permit the State Engineer to reject new
applications on the same water. Such new applications
ought not to be rejected until the water has been aetually
appropriated and a certificate of approp·riation has issued.
W ATER.S RUNNING TO WASTE ARE UNAPROPRIATED WATERS
There is another factor which indicates that the
waters in question are unappropriated. The Supreme
Court said in the case of F'alkenbierg v. Neff, 72 Utah
258, 2'69 P. 1008, that where the plaintiff and defendant
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both held approved applications and the defendant's wa.s
prior in time, the defendant had no right to complain of
the diversion of "~ater by the plaintiff if the defendant
"~as not then in a. position to use the water beneficially.
That at such ti.nre~ as a pri.or appropriator is not usitn.g
the u·a.ter for a beneficial punpose such wtaters .a'fie con,..
sidered a.nd treat~ed as urna,pp,opriated public ·wi(J)tl0rs arnd
for such peri.od of t,in~e are subject to ·ap~p~ropr~at~on a;nd
use by .others.
To the same effect see Aaams v. Port~age Irr. Res.
& Potcer Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P. 2d 648. The court there said
that though the flow of water may be within the quantum
of water to the use of which an appropriator has a pr,eferential right, during any time it is not being used
beneficially and economically it still is, remains or becomes publici ju.ris subject to all common rights of the
public to appropriate and use. 'There are other cases in
the Utah reports to like effect. No one can hold a right
to waste water. At such times as he is not, by virtue of
a prior appr9priation, using the water he cannot complain at use of the water by others. Water running to
waste is for the moment public water, subject to ap.propriation and use.
This case was presented to the State Engineer as a
private dispute between an irrigation company and a
landowner, on whose land waters arise by seepage. Each
claimed a superior right to use the water. At the time of
the dispute the waters were running to waste. The State
Engineer, by approving the application, simply intended
to settle the immediate dispute between those two users
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and to recognize in Jones a superior right of use because
he had filed on it and Lehi Irrigation Company had not.
'rhe approval order was expressly made ''subject to prior
rights.'' Certainly under the cases cited next above there
was a sufficient showing to justify the approval of the application. Whether or not the Provo River Water Users
Association can later reassert the right to capture this
water is entirely foreign to this law suit. The water was
unappropriated because (1) no one had perfected an appropriation on it (there were only applications which
had not yet ripened into appropriations) and (2) the
waters were running to waste and the Supreme Court
has said that when the waters are running to waste they
become publici j111ris and others may appropriate and use
them, subject to prior rights.
I

Under such a state of the facts the State Engineer
was required to approve the app~lication. There was,
under the adjudicated cases, an affirmative showing that
the waters in question were unappropriated. But certainly one can say that there is a reasonable basis for believing that a right of use might be perfected.
WATERS WHICH HAVE E·SCAPED ARE PUBLIC
WAT'ERS
There is much in the Utah cases to indicate that
once water escapes from the lands of an original appropriator he may not follow tha.t water into or upon the
lands of another and there recapture it. There are also
holdings to the effect that once water returns to a natural channel or source, and there commingles with other
waters, the right of the original appropriator is lost; that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the \Yater becon1es public \vater subject again to appropriation. The rases to follow are not cited for the purpose of asking the court to rule against the Provo l~iver
''rater Users A.\.ssociation on the merits. They are merely
cited to demonstrate that the State Engineer was confronted \Yith a situation in which he could legally believe
that there \vas a reasonable basis for believing that a
right mig·ht be perfected. See for example OZark v. North
Cottonzcood /.rr. & Water Co., 79 Utah 425, 11 P. 2.d 300.
This was a suit to quiet title to the waters of North ~Cot
tonwood Creek. The plaintiff sought to establish a right
to waters that had seeped back to the main channel after
having been used by the plaintiff for irrigation. The
court said that it is quite generally held that one may not
acquire a perfected right to have seep,age water kept up,
but when seepage water finds its way back to the natural
~tream from which it originally came such water may be
appropriated and again diverted and used upon other
lands. All of the parties to this litigation, the court said,
procee\ded well they might upon the theory that the seepage water in controversy was subject to appropriation.
The facts clearly showed that the seepage water in question drained from irrigation hack into the natural channel and again became a part of the natural stream.
In the instant case it is clear that the waters in question did escape the control of the original appropriator.
They had manifest themselves in the form of springs
and seeps on the lands of Jones ; they had returned to
a natural source of supply and the North Cottonwood
case states that they became open to appropriation.
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The State Engineer believes that the court must yet
straighten out the law in regard to the right of a party to
follow or recapture seepage water. It appears to us that
in this regard the law is in a state of flux; that whether
or not the Provo River Water Users Association is going
to be able to follow this water through the lands of others
and into Utah Lake is an important legal question. There
is much in the Utah cases to suggest that this water has
become public water because it has escaped. Whether the
la vv finally becomes settled along those lines or not there
certainly now is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not
this applicant can perfect an application. There are at
least three theories upon which he might eventually prevail. ( 1) That the water is not appropriated because there
is no perfected ·appropriation covering it, ( qnly applications) ; ( 2) that the water was at the time going to waste
and that water while wasting is public water open to appropriation, and (3) waters which have escaped from the
control of the original appropriator and found their way
back into a natural source of supply again becomes public
\Vater, open to appropriation; that the right to recapture
and reuse water requires that you keep the water under
control and in your possession and that if it escapes,
then, like the wind and the sunshine and the air, it hecomes free by nature and public in character. At least
it must be said at this point that there is a reasonable
basis for believing that this applicant can perfect a filing.
THERE ARE O·THER P AR.TIES WHO
SHO:ULD BE BEFORE THE CO·URT AND
OTHER FACTS THAT THE CO'URT ·sH:OULD
HA\TE AT ITS DISPOS-AJ.J BEFO·RE RULING
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OX THE QUESTI()N OF O'VNERSIIII> OF
THIS '\7 ATER BY I>R()\,.() RESER\T()lR CO~IP~-\.XY.

Sinee the State Engineer has no judicial powers, and
since he 1nust not, in passing on an application to a:ppropriate "Tater atteinpt to adjudicate existing rights, both
the State Engineer and the court should inquire into
those matters in only a very general way. L~t!tle C\o,ttonzc;ood llra.ter Co. v. Kimball, supra. There are water users
\Vho contend that Utah Lake is, in effect, their private
reservoir; that they own the storage capacity of Utah
Lake up to a point known as Compromise point and that
above that level there is no right to inundate farm lands.
Those parties have argued in the past that the Bureau
of R.eclamation and the Provo River Waters Users Association can not retain title to see-page waters after they
escape into Utah Lake and they have indicated that they
will oppose any attempt to perfect such a scheme for recapturing and reusing this water. Those parties are not
no\v before the court and this court ought not to make
a ruling now which, under principles of sta.re decisis,
would control future litigation on this point. Neither
Jones nor Lehi Irrigation Company are too much concerned over that point.
Furthermore, there has, from the first, been some
question in the mind of the State El}gineer and his staff
as to whether anyone can store water in Utah Lake and
claim that the water was being beneficially used. The
area of the lake is so large and the water so shallow that
there are tremendous evaporation losses. So much s·o
that the time may well come when this court will .hold
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that it is not a beneficial use to store water in such a
wasteful reservoir.
The waters of the entire area are covered by a general adjudication suit pending before the ·State Engineer.
One day the p~roblems which the Amicus Curiae seeks to
raise will be squarely presented to the court by parties
who are directly concerned. For the time being this is
a private law suit between two small water users, each
of whom claims the right to use waters which are running
to waste, and which have escaped from the control of the
original appropriator. The vested rights of Provo River
Water Users Association will not he adversely affected.
Their only complaint is that at some future date they
may be required to litigate this matter with Jones to recapture the water and that Jones might make a nuisance
of himself in interfering with their flow. 'This court has
always told the State Engineer that the mere fact that
a man is given the "fighting'' right high on a stream is
no justification for refusing his application. See Rocky
Ford Irr. ·Co. v. Kents Lake, supra.
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SUl\~l~IARY

The Supren1e Court has told the State Engineer that
he has no judicial po,Yers; that he must not, in ruling on
an application, attempt to adjudicate or deter1nine vested
rights. On the question of vested rights the State Engineer is to make only a very general inquiry. If, after
such an inquiry, he has any reasonable basis for believing that a right might be perfected, he is to resolve such
doubts in favor of approvaL The Supreme Court has
also said that an application to appropriate water is not
an appropriation and that waters covered only by an
application are still not appropriated. The court has also
said that waters running to waste are for the time being
public waters open to appropriation, and that waters
which have escaped from the control of the original appropriator and returned to the natural source of supply
again become public waters. All three of the above are
present in the instant case and combined they certainly
suggest a reasonable doubt as to whether or not all of
the waters are appropriated. Therefore, the application
should have been approved. The other issues as to ownership raised by the Amicus Curiae simply ask this co~rt
to do what it has already told the State Engineer he must
not do, to-wit: make an adjudication of vested rights.
Respectfully submitted,
GROIVE·R A. GILE·S
Attorney General

E·DWARD W. CLY·DE,
SpeciJal Ass~~- Attorney General
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